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1 Only one of the two major candidates in the 2016 presidential election had an established
record in foreign policy while the other most decidedly did not. For that reason, among
many others, it was assumed throughout most of the campaign that Hillary Clinton would
soon be  taking charge of  the  presidency.  Although she did not  achieve that  goal,  it
remains important to understand her strategic orientation and her legacy as Secretary of
State of  the U.S.  (2009-2013) because in this  position she,  and the president she was
serving,  did  leave  an  intelligible  legacy,  the  study  of  which  can  contribute  to  our
understanding of the contemporary world order. 
2 This article draws attention to U.S. policy in a group of countries that are not usually
considered to be of great strategic importance: the republics of Guatemala, Honduras and
El  Salvador,  which  make  up  the  so-called  “Northern  Triangle”  of  Central  America.
However insignificant they might seem at first glance in a strategic perspective, it can be
argued that U.S. policy in these countries over the past few decades, including the Obama
era, provides important clues about how the U.S. exercises power in the international
political and economic system, whether Democrats or Republicans are in power. 
3 Obama and Clinton have left two parallel legacies in Central America: the first has to do
with a  major  political  event  and the second takes  the form of  an ongoing,  ordinary
pattern of relations. The political event was the military coup d’Etat in Honduras in late
June 2009 against elected president Manuel Zelaya. It was staged by a group of military
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officers and businessmen who removed him from his house at night, flew him out of the
country, and declared that political life in Honduras would proceed without him. He was
accused of trying to organize a referendum to extend his term of office, but such a move
was impossible. The authors of the coup were mainly concerned about the defense of
dominant class interests which they saw as threatened. Although Zelaya was himself a
member of the landed elite, he began during his term of office to move in a direction that
could be described as “slightly leftward”. According to a Foreign Policy in Focus analysis:
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez offered discounted oil to Honduras and Zelaya
accepted. He developed modest but real new domestic initiatives, including raising
the minimum wage, which infuriated the business community.  And he began to
collaborate with the foreign policy initiatives of the Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas,  the  Venezuelan-led  political  alliance.  His  leftist  rhetoric  and populist
programs won him a degree of domestic political support from organized campesino
groups  and  some  trade  unions  (…).  At  the  same  time,  his  increasingly  radical
rhetoric infuriated sections of the traditional elite, and the political class began to
turn  away  from  Zelaya.  He  lost  the  support  of  his  own  political  party  in  the
Congress (Thale 2009).
4 The  coup  against  Zelaya  was  condemned  by  the  UN,  the  European  Union,  the
Organization  of  American  States  (from  which  Honduras  was  suspended),  and  even,
initially, by the Obama administration, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was less
determined to see the constitutional order restored in Honduras than she claimed. There
is much investigative research showing how Hillary Clinton supported Zelaya’s overthrow
once it occurred (for example, Joyce 2010; Weisbrot 2009, 2014; Shorrock 2016). Despite
numerous  public  declarations  and  diplomatic  gestures  intending to  convey  the
impression that the U.S. was attached to restoring democracy, in practice she allowed
those seeking to keep Zelaya from resuming his term of office to gain time and took an
active role in promoting the idea of post-coup elections that did not include Zelaya but
opened the way for the civilian promoters of the coup to assume power. Such elections
did take place in November 2009, when interim coup president Roberto Micheletti was
replaced by “legally” elected president Porfirio Lobo. The military coup was relayed into
a civilian one. 
5 Hillary Clinton mentions these events briefly in her book Hard Choices (2014), a 500-page
memoir about her four years as Secretary of State1. However, in the paperback version of
the book she removed the sentences, included in the hardcover edition, in which she
explicitly admits her objective of making the return of Zelaya impossible: 
In the subsequent days [after the coup] I spoke with my counterparts around the
hemisphere, including Secretary Espinosa in Mexico. We strategized on a plan to
restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held
quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot and give
the Honduran people a chance to choose their own future (quoted in Beeton and
Tang 2016). 
6 As a result of the coup and the post-coup regime, dozens of social activists have been
assassinated,  including a  very prominent  one,  Berta Cáceres,  44,  renowned leader  of
indigenous struggles against the construction of dams and other projects on the lands of
the Lenca people. Before being cut down on March 3, 2016, Berta Cáceres spoke out about
the role of the U.S in upholding the coup and the danger this policy represented for
movements like hers. Since 2009, assassinations of activist leaders have continued on a
regular basis (Weisbrot 2016) and social movements have been forced to operate with
extreme caution under threat of physical risk. 
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7 Although the record shows that Hillary Clinton took the lead in handling this matter in
2009, Barack Obama, as president, was also called to account for the coup. He did first
condemn it as illegal, but he was content at the North American Leaders’ Summit a few
days after the coup, to make the following statement: 
The same critics  who say  that  the  United  States  has  not  intervened enough in
Honduras,  are the same people who say that we're always intervening and that
Yankees  need  to  get  out  of  Latin  America.  You  can't  have  it  both  ways.  (CNN
politicalticker, August 10, 2009) 
8 To this statement, John Ackerman, Mexican legal scholar and political commentator, has
replied: 
The idea that the the U.S. can “not intervene” in Latin America is a fantasy. It is
always present. The question is not whether they intervene but how they do so. Is it
in  favor  of  authoritarian  regimes,  or  in  favor  of  democratic  social  movements?
(Ackerman 2015, p. 70) 
9 In  the  meantime,  Honduras’  social  and  economic  situation  has  deteriorated  greatly.
Already before the coup, Honduras suffered from high levels of chronic social violence
and deep social  inequalities;  those conditions have only deteriorated in recent years.
According to estimates from 2010 and 2011, about 60% of the population of Honduras
lived in poverty as  well  as  37% of  the population of  El  Salvador and 54% of  that  of
Guatemala (CIA World Factbook, quoted in Rosenblum and Ball 2016). A Migration Policy
Institute Report states that “all three Northern Triangle countries continue to experience
high  levels  of  violence,  food  insecurity  and  poverty,  the  primary  push  factors,
contributing to migration outflows from the region” (Rosenblum and Ball 2016, p. 3). 
 
Macro-sociological and systemic mapping
10 Although the U.S. role – and that of Hillary Clinton in particular – may be considered
open to criticism by any standards of “democracy promotion”, the objective of this paper
is  not  simply  to  criticize  this  episode  in  U.S.  policy,  but  above  all  to  examine  it  as
symptomatic of broader and deeper tendencies in U.S.-Central American relations, and
U.S.-Latin American relations more broadly, over the past several decades. The forms of
endemic social and paramilitary violence spoken of here will seem familiar to anyone
who has observed Colombia or Mexico, but contextualizing and explaining the Central
American situation requires specific attention to conditions in these countries. How can
different forms of endemic violence be seen not only as feeding into each other, but as
products or symptoms of the more systemic logics of neoliberalism as it has taken form
over the past 3-4 decades. The following is an initial attempt to map out the field in a way
that shows how these locally observable trends reflect deeper regional and systemic ones.
11 Immigration is a convenient and revealing starting point for this investigation. Much
attention is currently being paid to what has caused so many Central Americans, women
and minors in particular, to flee their countries and attempt to reach the United States
these past several years. In the summer of 2014, a crisis was declared on the U.S.-Mexican
border when a surge in the number of arriving women and minors took place. In May and
June of that year alone, about 20,000 Central American children arrived at the southern
border, mostly in Texas. For fiscal year 2014, a record of over 65,000 apprehensions of
minors and children were recorded at the border (Meyer et. al. 2016, p. 1). These flows
have fallen and risen various times since then, but they have not ceased. As the director
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of a child protection agency in Honduras has declared, “Central America has become a
factory  of  migrants.  There  is  no  access  to  resources,  to  economic  or  educational
opportunities  and no trust  in government actors… These people are not  chasing the
American dream – they’re fleeing a Central American nightmare” (García 2015).
12 Much has  been written about  the conditions under which these migrants  have been
received in the U.S., their conditions of detention, their difficult battle to be recognized
as refugees (for example, Meyer et. al.; Hiskey et. al., 2016; Chishti and Hipsman, 2016).
There is also a growing body of research about the current U.S. policy of prevailing on
Mexico to capture and deport back to Central America as many of these migrants as
possible before they reach the U.S., too often with disastrous results for those forcibly
returned to the environments they were fleeing (Domínguez Villegas and Rietig, 2015).
These are important subjects in themselves, but they are mostly symptoms of the broader
dynamics mentioned above. 
13 Starting with these flows which have elicited a strong security-oriented response from
the U.S., we may then ask, in a sociological perspective, about the “push” factors – the
social and economic conditions of life – that have driven so many Central Americans,
including many women and minors, to migrate in spite of all the risks. This in turn leads
to questions about the transformations of capitalism in Central America over the past 20
to 30 years since the end of the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, and about the
implications of these transformations for political institutions – in other words, how has
neoliberalism affected the democratic transitions in each country? 
14 Sociologist  William  I.  Robinson  has  carried  out  his  well-known  theoretical  work  on
transnational capitalism against the empirical backdrop of Central America, in particular
in the book Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization (2003). In
the chapters of this work focusing on the recent history of several Central American
countries, he shows how U.S. policy during the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador,
under Reagan, was not just about defeating revolutionary movements (unlike the one
which had triumphed in Nicaragua in 1979) by supplying weapons and training to the
local armies and paramilitary groups; it was also, and simultaneously, about imposing on
governments, in the midst of civil wars, via USAID, programs to reorganize their private
sector and reconfigure the state in ways compatible with neoliberal social and economic
policies.  While  it  is  not  possible  here  to  examine  in  detail  his  account  of  the
transformations  undertaken,  it  is  important  to  stress  the  correlation  he  establishes
between  neoliberal  capitalist  transformation  and  a  given  type  of  political  regime
characterized as polyarchy: 
When US policy makers and transnational elites talk about democracy promotion,
what they really mean is the promotion of polyarchy. This refers to a system in
which a small group actually rules, and mass participation and decision-making are
confined to choosing leaders in elections that are carefully managed by competing
elites. ln the age of globalization, polyarchy is generally a more reliable political
system  for  containing  and  defusing  mass  pressure  for  popular  social  change
(Robinson 2007, p. 33).
15 There has indeed been a form of transition to democratic rule since the 1980s but the
notion of polyarchy marks the limits of democracy under neoliberal conditions:
At the level of the dominant project, the old authoritarian regimes have crumbled
through transitions to polyarchy, and leftist movements that in the 1980s posed an
anti-systemic alternative to integration in the emergent global  order have been
defeated or transformed. In each Central American country, a transnationalized,
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“technocratic” or New Right fraction gained hegemony within the dominant classes
and pushed  the  transnational  agenda  of  neoliberalism and the  consolidation  of
polyarchies (Robinson 2003, p. 65).
16 In  the  Central  American  regimes  established  after  the  civil  wars,  democracy  has
progressed in some respects but it is combined with a top-down diffusion of neoliberal
norms and mechanisms. The exercise of rights by ordinary citizens has been plagued by
endemic social violence and continuing selective violence against activists of the left (see
Moodie,  2010,  for  an  excellent  study  of  the  Salvadoran  case  that  illustrates  these
points).With such regimes, regression toward authoritarian rule is a possibility; the coup
in Honduras is the one most obvious case of such regression. 
17 Another important ingredient of this socio-historical configuration is the politics of free
trade. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement,  referred to in
short as CAFTA-DR, which covers the region’s economic dealings with the U.S., took effect
in  2004.  It  includes  all  the  Central  American countries  except  Panama.  Whatever  its
advantages for some sectors of industry, there is ample documentation to the effect that
the agreement has resulted in the displacement of many farmers from their land; in the
maintaining of poor wage standards and labor conditions, especially in export-related
industries; in the opening, of large quantities of land for mining, thanks to environmental
deregulation;  in  major  obstacles  to  the  passage,  in  any  of  these  countries,  of  any
regulatory legislation, because of investor state dispute-settlement mechanisms which
allow the corporations, almost always, to prevail (Pérez-Rocha 2014; Public Citizen 2014).
Much more research needs to be done on the effects of this agreement on living standards
for Central American workers, and on environmental standards in those countries. 
 
The roots of local and transnationalized and social
violence
18 In  2012  the  rate  of  murder  per  100,000  people  in  the  population was  over  90  in  El
Salvador, and over 85 in Honduras, as compared to 53 in Venezuela, 33.8 in Colombia, 4.7
in the US and 1.0 in the UK (Igarape Institute, quoted in The Guardian 22 August 2015). 
19 The high levels of violence in these countries today clearly has several different but inter-
related sources. The heritage of the civil wars and the counter-revolutionary paramilitary
groups and death squads from the 1980s and early 90s is not to be minimized (Dudley
2012, p. 7-8). Guatemala has a specific heritage of genocidal violence against indigenous
peoples during an extended period of civil war (1960-1996). However, these periods of
prolonged conflict cannot alone explain today’s high levels of social violence. 
20 The status of Central American states in the regional and international order – that is,
their status of dependent state formations in historic situations of dependent capitalism,
may be said to have already “predisposed” these societies to high levels of social violence,
because these state formations were among the most oligarchically-controlled, despotic
and violent as anywhere in Latin America (Munck 1984). These were indeed the state
formations and national spaces which, along with Nicaragua, gave rise to what historian
Walter LaFeber characterized as “inevitable revolutions” (LaFeber 1993). While the Cold
War, that is, Soviet and Cuban influence real or imagined, served as a the lens through
which the Reagan administration claimed to read events in Central America in the 1980s,
LaFeber shows clearly that the roots of revolutionary movements in all these countries
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were “endogenous”, that is, not explainable as pure proxy wars between superpowers,
but rather as uprisings against durably inegalitarian and despotic forms of rule resulting
from a long heritage of colonial and capitalist dependency. 
21 From a more immediate and contemporary perspective, the social violence with which
the countries of the Northern Triangle are rife has a strong transnational dimension, not
just because of transnationalizing capitalism and its overall socio-economic effects, but
also because of a particular category of actors who are a product of this configuration:
young  deportees  from  the  U.S.  back  to  Central  America,  among  whom  are  many
transnationalized  youth  gang  members.  These  gangs,  which  originated  in  the  U.S.,
principally in the Los Angeles area,  were transplanted to El  Salvador,  Guatemala and
other places via the deportation of gang members. Their activity has contributed greatly
to the already-endemic social violence that has plagued the cities of Central America,
especially its northern tier. Salvadoran historian Joaquín M. Chávez writes: 
The  appalling  social  impacts  of  the  neoliberal  reform implemented  by  ARENA2
governments in urban and rural communities, and the institutional weaknesses of
the country’s judicial system, its National Civilian Police and other state agencies
that were created as a result of the peace accords – as well as the endemic lack of
public services and labor and educational opportunities in urban communities like
San  Salvador  –  have  all  enabled  the  rapid  expansion  of  gang  networks  among
socially marginalized Salvadoran youth (Chávez 2016, p. 211). 
22 The U.S. has contributed powerfully to this problem by deporting to Northern Triangle
Countries large numbers of convicted gang members. Between 2001 and 2010, the U.S.
deported 129,726 convicted criminals to Central America, over 90% of whom went to the
Northern Triangle. With these deportations the two most important gangs of Los Angeles,
Mara Salvatrucha 13 and Barrio 18, have also become the two most important gangs of
the Northern Triangle region, with anywhere between 60,000 and 95,000 members active
depending on estimates (Dudley 2012, p. 8-9; see also Zilberg, 2011). 
23 Drug cartels, usually associated with Colombia and Mexico, are of growing importance in
the Northern Triangle as well. The authors of a Migration Policy Institute study write: 
Over the past two decades, organized crime has taken control of critical economic
activities in Mexico and the Northern Triangle. Non-institutional actors – particular
drug cartels – have overrun and transformed the social landscape, challenging the
government’s monopoly on the use of force, while corruption has spread and taken
deeper root at various levels of government and law enforcement. (Papademetriou
et. al. 2013, p. 17). 
24 There  are  clear  indications  of  a  correlation  between the  coup in  Honduras  and  the
appearance  of  cartels  which  have  found  safe  havens  in  portions  of  the  Honduran
territory,  in  particular  near  the  border  with  Guatemala.  Today  certain  cartels  are
acquiring land on which to develop safe havens, and they are doing so by forcing people
off that land by threatening them with death if they do not sell or simply cede their
property. The majority of the targeted populations are communities of indigenous people
living in the area near the northern coast of Honduras (McSweeney and Pearson, 2013). 
25 What is taking shape in such regions has been described by Canadian researcher and
investigative journalist Dawn Paley as a form of drug war capitalism, that is, a form of
accumulation of capital that involves much violence and dispossession exercised by the
cartels while complicit politicians look on (Paley, 2014). Honduras is relatively new to this
type of scenario, in part because cartels based in Mexico have developed bases outside
that country to escape the heat of military pursuit there. Drug war capitalism, argues
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Dawn Paley, needs to be understood in its systemic dimension, that is,  as part of the
regional  and world  system of  transnational  capitalism.  Here is  a  brief  summary of her
analysis:
The war on drugs is a long-term fix to capitalism’s woes, combining terror with
policymaking  in  a  seasoned  neoliberal  mix,  cracking  open  social  worlds  and
territories once unavailable to globalized capitalism. (…) The notion that there is a
clear  division  between  state  forces  and  crime  groups  –  that  corruption  and
collaboration are the work of a few bad apples – is a hegemonic idea promoted by
nation-states and the mainstream media. Undoing this binary means learning from
the people whose lives have been directly affected by armed groups whose activity
is carried out with impunity. Impunity is not the result of a weak or deficient state,
but rather it is actively provided to the gamut of armed groups who commit crimes
and  acts  of  terror  against  citizens,  migrants  and  the  poor.  The  provision  of
impunity to armed actors who are politically aligned with capitalism is part of a
modern nation state’s raison d’être (Paley 2014, p. 16-17). 
26 Paley’s  claim  that  drug  war  violence  is  a  “fix”,  that  is,  functionally  necessary  for
capitalism,  is  very  bold  but  highly  debatable  and  has  generated  much  debate.  Her
observation  that  state  forces  and  crime  groups  are  often  impossible  to  tell  apart  is
verified in several case studies that she has carried out in Mexico, Colombia and the
Northern Triangle.
 
U.S. responsibilities and policy choices
27 The overall picture of Central American societies as modeled by neoliberally-inflected
capitalism since the mid-1980s needs of course to be completed but in terms of general
levels of well-being and security, the record is rather dismal and the problems posed to
these societies appear intractable. As we begin to establish connections and map out the
field of class relations, power relations, and international and transnational relations in
which these countries are situated, it is necessary to understand the precise role of the
U.S. as a power and of U.S.-based corporations in contributing to such a dire situation.
The problems of social violence we are foregrounding here are chronic and could also be
called  systemic,  but  that  does  not  mean  they  are  generated  automatically,  or
“functionally”, by a transnational capitalist system independently of the will of powerful
political actors. Political choices do count a great deal, as the discussion of the Honduran
coup was indeed meant to suggest.
28 The dimension of choice may be in part obscured because of the high degree of continuity
between Democratic and Republican administrations in Central American policy since the
1990s. Whoever has been in government since the 1990s, the U.S. as a power has allowed
the  situation  in  these  countries  to  degenerate  to  the  point  where  there  is  now  an
immigration “boomerang effect” which calls Washington’s attention to the situation in
these  countries  in  a  way  that  poverty  and  endemic  violence  alone  would  not..  The
Democratic Obama administration proved no exception. Far from making serious efforts
to  favor  economic  and  social  development  in  these  countries,  it  continued  to  treat
violence  and migration at  best  as  security  issues,  that  is,  at  the  level  of  symptoms.
Regarding migration, the policy has been to try to diminish the number of arrivals from
Central America by prevailing on Mexico to arrest as many of the migrants as possible
and  deport  them  to  their  home  countries,  where  they  return  to  the  same  dismal
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conditions as before and are often exposed to the very violence they were trying to
escape (Dominguez Villegas and Rietig 2015). 
29  The U.S. has established programs with El Salvador and other countries to coordinate the
surveillance and the policing of gang members. At the same time it has remained U.S.
policy to deport as many “criminal aliens” as possible back to their home countries since
it is taken for granted that that is where they belong. Efforts to actually transform the
social environment in which crime and violence flourish have not amounted to much.
The  relevant  U.S.  program,  known  as  CARSI  (Central  America  Regional  Security
Initiative),  has  existed since 2008,  under Bush,  and has been financed at  the rate of
roughly a billion dollars to date. Its mission is defined as follows: 
• Assist  law  enforcement  and  security  forces  to  confront  narcotics  and  arms  trafficking,
gangs,  organized  crime,  and  border  security  deficiencies,  as  well  as  to  disrupt  criminal
infrastructure, routes, and networks;
• Build the capacity of law enforcement and the justice sector to serve citizens and to address
regional threats; 
• Advance community policing, gang prevention, and economic and social programming for
at-risk  youth  and  communities  disproportionately  affected  by  crime.  (source  :  http://
www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/carsi/) 
30 From this  mission  statement  it  is  clear  that  nothing  is  envisioned  to  deal  with  the
problems  at  their  socio-economic  roots.  The  prevailing  policy  framework,  not
surprisingly, is geared to the needs of U.S. society and fails to take a regional view. 
31 Few people anywhere in the federal government have been thinking about alternative
approaches to these problems. However, a few members of Congress have showed signs of
broadening their view and taking into account regional dynamics and not just national
ones.  Among them are  Senator  Bernie  Sanders  of  Vermont  and  Representative  Raúl
Grijalva of Arizona, who have made an effort to understand the social conditions from
which many migrants are fleeing. In July 2015, Grijalva organized hearings in Congress on
the  question  of  unaccompanied  minors  (Hendley,  2015).  Sanders’  program  for
immigration,  as  elaborated  on his  2016  presidential  campaign website,  was  the  only
program of any candidate to address immigration as a transnational question and not just
of narrow national interest. The program reads in part: 
Inequality across the world is universally acknowledged as the driving force behind
migration. (…) For example, the ill-conceived NAFTA devastated local economies
and pushed millions to migrate. (…) Not only have our trade policies with Mexico,
Central America, and China led to the loss of millions of decent-paying jobs and
thousands  of  factories,  but  they  have  led  to  destitution  for  local  communities
around the world. Accordingly, our nation must level the playing field for workers
everywhere. Those who wish to remain in their home country should be able to
earn livable  wages  and not  [have  to]  migrate  for  economic  survival.  (…)  Multi-
faceted policies that look beyond our borders are critical to addressing the root
causes  of  migration  and  economic  inequality  (from  “A  Fair  and  Humane
Immigration Policy” on the website “Bernie 2016”).
32 There is little use discussing today the approach of Hillary Clinton, but there is little
reason to believe that she might, as president, have undertaken bold action to change the
prevailing pattern of relations. As for Donald Trump, there is less reason still to believe
that his administration will do anything to remedy these problems, and much reason to
believe things will only be made worse, since one of his main campaign commitments,
confirmed  in  the  first  few  months  of  his  administration,  was  to  accelerate  the
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apprehensions and deportations of undocumented migrants. His narrowly nationalistic
and xenophobic approach to migration is a way of simply denying any U.S. responsibility
for the grim situation in the Northern Triangle, or anywhere else. As was predictable, his
budgetary  proposal  for  2018  calls  for  less  aid  to  Central America  overall,  and  more
measures in the name of “security” (Hiemstra 2017). The goal of promoting “prosperity”
exclusively by encouraging more capital investment under existing social conditions is
certain to continue generating more insecurity and contributing to the spiral of social
violence.
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NOTES
1. The paperback edition, with this sentence expurgated, was published by Simon & Schuster in
2014.
2. ARENA:  Alianza  Republicana  Nacionalista,  a  right-wing  political  party  founded  by  Roberto
D’Aubisson  in  1982  in  the  middle  of  the  civil  war.  D’Aubuisson  was  known  for  his  role  in
organizing death squads. ARENA presidents were victorious in four straight elections from 1989
to 2004 and governed the country for two decades. 
ABSTRACTS
Whichever party has been in office, the U.S. since the 1980s has strongly promoted the adoption
in  Central  America  of  neoliberal  policies  and  mechanisms  of  government  while  taking  no
effective measures to combat at its roots the tide of social violence that such policies have helped
to engender.  The policy of deporting migrants,  including many gang members,  back to their
countries of birth has only further caused violence to spiral as recently established democratic
regimes struggle with issues of basic civil order. The coup d’Etat in Honduras in June 2009, which
the Obama administration first condemned but then upheld, serves as an extreme example of
how such policies can undermine the social order and open the door to authoritarian regression.
The purpose of this article is to begin to account for prevalent forms of social violence in the
Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador) macro-sociologically,
taking transnational migration into account,  but also strategically,  that is,  by examining U.S.
policy orientations. 
Quel  que  soit  le  parti  au  pouvoir,  les  Etats-Unis,  depuis  les  1980,  promeuvent  en  Amérique
centrale  l’adoption  de  politiques  et  de  mécanismes  de  gouvernement  néolibéraux  sans  pour
autant  prendre  de  mesures  efficaces  contre  la  montée  de  la  violence  sociale  que  de  telles
politiques ont contribué à engendrer. La politique consistant à expulser de nombreux membres
de gangs vers leur pays de naissance n’a fait qu’aggraver les violences chroniques, pendant que
des régimes démocratiques peinent à établir l’ordre civil.  Le coup d’Etat au Honduras en juin
2009,  d’abord  condamné  par l’administration  Obama,  puis défendu,  constitue  un  exemple
extrême de la manière dont de telles politiques peuvent miner l’ordre social et ouvrir la porte à
des régressions autoritaires.  L’article vise à rendre compte des formes courantes de violence
sociale dans le Triangle Nord de l’Amérique centrale (Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador) dans une
perspective macro-sociologique, en prenant en compte les migrations transnationales, mais aussi
de façon stratégique, en examinant les orientations de la politique étatsunienne. 
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